In today’s online edition, The Atlantic featured an exceedingly silly analysis of conflict resolution in Nigeria, authored by journalist and self-described “Africa-watcher” G. Pascal Zachary. Having read Chinua Achebe’s opus all too literally, Zachary offers a “creative” solution to Nigeria’s malaise: the division of sub-Saharan Africa’s most populous state into “three or more ‘organic’ territories.” For Zachary, a partitioned Nigeria would resolve a triumvirate of domestic and international crises: ideological schisms between Nigeria’s Christian and Muslim sects, political instability, and the security of U.S. strategic interests. Ignore, for a second, Zachary’s egregious, clichéd depiction of Nigerian society (“deformed,” for one, but also “the most troubling aspects of African contemporary life”), or the persistent analytical bankruptcy of “Nigeria on the brink” commentary. Beyond these broad, simplistic characterizations, Zachary’s depiction of Nigeria’s political trajectory hardly coincides with reality. Without an empirical leg to stand on, his assessment of a partition’s potential contribution to the present crisis in misguided.
The “partition” approach to conflict resolution is hardly new–otherwise well-regarded policy experts have offered a similar model for political transition and stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. International relations realists, especially, view partition as a feasible resolution to ethnic civil wars, which, under the security dilemma, rely on the continuous and escalating manifestation of clashing identity histories within coercive political institutions. Kaufmann (gated), for instance, constructs an artificial distinction between ideological and ethnic civil war, ignoring the inherent dynamism of ethnicized political identities, publicly advertised ideologies, and violent mobilization. Until the intervening forces remove the civil war’s security dilemma–in this case, through the forcible establishment of divided, ethnicized territorial entities–international actors can expect no sustainable resolution to intrastate conflict. Sambanis (gated) mounts the most effective rejoinder to the post-Balkans partition frenzy: in contrast to the assessments of partition supporters, a quantitative assessment of postwar partitions (twenty-one of them, to be precise) indicates few conclusive benefits for post-conflict democratization, short-term human security, or sustainable peace.
Beyond the theoretical perspective, Zachary’s partition does little to address the present state of Nigerian political development:
On Nigeria’s ideological schisms: As previously mentioned, Zachary’s partition would rely on the creation of “three or more ‘organic’ territories.” Presumably, Zachary’s “organic” divisions refer to Nigeria’s three primary ethnic groups: the Ibo, in the country’s southeast; the Yoruba, in Nigeria’s southwest; and the Hausa Fulani, based in the predominantly Muslim North. Of course, there’s nothing “organic” about Nigeria’s ethnic divisions–beyond and within the three predominant groups lie approximately 240 smaller communities, with varied divisions in religion, culture, and, most importantly, political affiliation. When it comes to national politics, various groups consolidate their support for an archetypal “Muslim” or “Christian” candidate. Meanwhile, localized allegiances complicate Zachary’s monolithic depiction of Nigeria’s ethnic politics; Boko Haram’s balanced targeting of Muslim and Christian civilian centers demonstrates the questionable saliency of undifferentiated religious categories.
On Nigeria’s political instability: In a NYT op-ed last year, Achebe described a “slow fitful movement towards strong democratic institutions” (Zachary’s words). Zachary dismisses Chinua Achebe’s call for a “Nigerian solution” to the political crisis as little more than a pipe-dream, unreflective of the country’s daunting security, economic, and social challenges. In reality, the data support Achebe’s assertion, although Nigeria’s process of democratization will move more slowly than the international community would prefer. As the University of Maryland’s Polity IV Project indicates, Nigerian governance has encountered gradual governance improvements since Obasanjo’s resumption of the presidency in 1999. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s governance index is likely a better indicator of Nigerian governance trends. According to the index, Nigeria’s governance rating has remained constant between 2006 and 2010, but with marked improvements in sustainable economic development and the rule of law. While gaps in human development and political participation remain, the relative picture is far rosier than Zachary’s “dismal continent” narrative suggests.
On U.S. strategic priorities: Zachary’s characterization of U.S. strategic interests is largely accurate. In his 2011 threat assessment, DNI Clapper outlined the strategic intersection of Nigeria’s oil supply, political violence, and regional instability. Nigeria’s governance trajectory is intimately linked to the distribution and quantity of petroleum revenues, as Goodluck Jonathan’s accession to the Nigerian labor unions’ fuel subsidy objections demonstrated. For Zachary, the sustainability of the U.S.-Nigeria strategic relationship depends, in large part, on the continuous flow of Nigerian oil. Partition would do little to facilitate a more secure, reliable energy source–indeed, the disaggregation and decentralization of oil politics would likely limit, rather than expand, the United States’ diplomatic maneuverability in West Africa. On the terrorism front, a weaker, partitioned Nigerian state would be largely incapable of addressing the emergent Boko Haram threat in Nigeria’s northern province, particularly in the absence of supportive oil revenues. With a partitioned Nigeria, the United States’ would find itself with an unreliable, regionally-focused amalgamation of political entities–that is, a Nigeria incapable of assuming a prominent role in sub-Saharan African affairs.
Rather than supporting Zachary’s fanciful policy proposals, the United States should seek to bolster the Nigerian state, allowing Goodluck Jonathan’s government to assume regional leadership of regional solutions. A strong, inclusive Nigerian state–not a persistently heterogeneous and politically impotent group of states–is a necessary precondition for “moving Nigeria back from the brink.”
The truth is that Nigeria is too big for the international community to have any meaningful impact on its future, anyway. All the speculation about Nigeria’s disintegration or unity is merely academic as there is the real possibility of events spiraling out of control.
Nigeria’s Christian community has shown remarkable restraint in the face of persistent provocation and government incompetence. That is about the only thing holding Nigeria together as a united entity.
If the Nigerian government does not get a handle on this crisis within the next couple of months and Boko Haram ups its game – all bets are off.
How do you deal with a problem like Boko Haram? Each attack leads to a violent retaliation by the Army and Police, leading to further radicalisation of masses of poor, angry young men. Each attack on a Church makes the possibility of Christian retaliation more, not less likely. Inserting the US Military in the fray does not guarantee success – if the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan is anything to go by, the US Military doesn’t to counter-insurgency in Muslim lands very well.
The Nigerian security services are not fit for purpose.
The only thing I guess we can do is pray. We seem to be on the road to Sierra Leone – all out sectarian war.
And a sectarian war is not going result in a united Nigeria. No force on earth will be strong enough to enforce the unity of a Christian dominated South with a largely Muslim North (living under Sharia law) in the aftermath of a sectarian war.
Especially when the bulk of the resources and industry in located in the South. A few French helicopters won’t do the trick here (like Ivory Coast). And the US will rather build a colony on the Moon than commit its troops to military operations in W. Africa.
Partition worked rather well in Asia (Malaysia and Singapore).
Any analyst who thinks that Sharia can coexist with Evangelical Christianity needs his head examined. That, exactly is the situation in Nigeria today.
Something has to give.
Those of us who were born in Nigeria, who live in Nigeria understand that the partition of Nigeria is not a matter of if, but when. If it is not triggered by Boko Haram it will be triggered by something else in future.
Nigeria is drifting apart slowly with mutual distrust rapidly replacing any feeling of national unity. Most Southerners now refuse to go up North, Christians are fleeing en masse from Northern Nigeria (from the harassment of religious police and Boko Haram). Permanent rifts are being created between communities.
I don’t know what you guys read, but try and talk a little bit more to Nigerians. Some are still living in denial, but the realists among us are realising that the game is up.
One more thing, most of the improvements in governance have been seen at the Local not Federal level – I am not quoting reports, my judgement is on how governance impacts my daily life.
State governments have done much better than the Federal Government in providing infrastructure. Federal responsibilities like electricity supplies, inter-state roads and policing have barely improved since Obasanjo came to power.
So if most of the improvement in governance comes from local administrators, of what use is the Federal Government? When governors of the Western (Yoruba speaking region) are meeting to coordinate economic development and South Eastern (Igbo speaking region) governors will soon follow suit, you’d be unwise not to spot a trend.
When a state like Lagos now generates 75% of its revenue from non-oil sources with a GDP greater than several African states – you know that the economic case for partition could be made convincingly should the need arise.
Think about these facts.